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The development of the United Nations economic system has been influenced by challenges
arising from the international political environment. It also reflects changing perceptions of
economic development in a rapidly integrating global economy. In considering that policy is made
in certain political and cultural contexts, normative values cannot be separated from technocratic
decision making (Jeong, 1995:79). One of the main issues in the United Nations reform has focused
on how. the system serves better basic needs of poor and vulnerable social groups with a stress on
investment in human resources. On the other hand, the issues of human needs are not equally
represented in different economic development strategies subscribed to by various agencies. The
struggle over the reform represents changing relationships between poor and rich countries as well
as the internal dynamics of the system.
Functionalist ideas based on cooperation on social and economic problems for the promotion
of peace and human welfare facilitated the establishment of networks of specialized agencies after
World War II. The increased number of independent states in former European colonies and the need
for economic assistance led to the initiation of the UN Development Decade in the early 1960s. The
dissatisfaction of Third World countries with the Western dominated economic order brought about
the declaration on a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which emphasized changes in the
international economic structure toward the goal of reducing the gap in the redistribution of global
wealth in the favor of the poor. The dismay of the system on both the rich and the poor followed the
failure of reaching agreements on global economic co-operation since the early 1980s. In recent
years, developing countries were disappointed with the lack of any progress in their negotiation with
industrialized countries, whereas developed countries moved serious economic discussion to
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institutional mechanisms, which they can easily control, such as the OECD and the G7.
Over the past several decades, changes in the UN have been directed toward the expansion
of the system by adding new units and organs, in response to the emergence of new issues such as
the environmental pollution and a lack of development in the Third World. No policy center,
however, has been successfully installed for coordinating economic development policies in the
system. More significantly, the absence of consensus on the role of the UN has resulted in illusions
of the UN's capacity and influence as well as the misperceptions of economic cooperation and
international development. One of the main purposes of this paper is to analyze how the UN system
has evolved in response to changes in the international political economy. Based on this analysis,
the paper discusses questions concerning major aspects of economic cooperation under the UN
system. Finally, various reform proposals are considered in the context of how to strengthen the UN
economic system in serving the majority of the global populations.
Functionalism and Specialized Agencies
After World War II, the theory of functionalism inspired the creation of a system of
specialized agencies at the world level which are responsible for economic, social, cultural,
educational, health and related fields. In Chapter IX on International Economic and Social
Cooperation, there is a strong emphasis on a general pledge for the promotion of higher standards
ofliving, full employment. 2 Technical experts may easily agree on international standards, rules or
other recommendations for enhancing economic development. It was believed that the agencies
constitute building blocks towards the construction of an orderly world system. The essential goal
of the institutional framework was to prevent future problems ofliberal capitalism.(Mayall, 1988:53)
The economic and social system of the UN was based on the loose relationships between
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separate organizations. According to Article 57 of the Charter, "The various specialized agencies,
established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as
defined in their basic instruments ... shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations."
In Article 63.2, the Economic and Social Council "may coordinate the activities of the specialized
agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Member of the United Nations." The role of
ECOSOC is only consultative and advisory, and, right from the outset, no central authority was
accorded ECOSOC. Specialized Agencies undertake to submit regular reports to ECOSOC, to send
representatives to each other's meetings and to exchange information. However, they are not in any
sense under ECOSOC jurisdiction or control.(Muller, 1992:7)
Specialized agencies were also loosely coordinated by other mechanisms. The Administrative
Committee on Coordination (ACC), chaired by the Secretary General and attended by the heads of
Specialized Agencies, was given a mandate to manage and coordinate general activities in economic
and social fields of the UN system. Later such institutions as the Consultative Committee on
Substantive Questions (CCSQ) were introduced to assist the task of ACC. In addition, Specialized
Agency budgets were, albeit superficially, reviewed in the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary)
Committee of the General Assembly. They can visit the Specialized Agencies once every two years
to review budgets.(Taylor, 1993:134)
The autonomy which the 1945 Charter accorded to the Specialized Agencies was a deliberate
attempt to encourage them to build confidence in their functional fields. The various Specialized
Agencies were set up as separate institutions, with its own membership, intergovernmental
institutions, budget, staff, executive head, and policies. It was envisaged that the Agencies would
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not be formally supervised by ECOSOC, nor would their secretariats be formally accountable to the
Secretary General. No matter whether development issues, administration or financial methods are
concerned, the Agencies cannot be obliged to adopt policies laid down by the Secretariat or other
bodies of the United Nations. The dangers and disadvantages of having one monolithic organization
were considered to outweigh the dangers and disadvantages of having a dispersed network.
However, the main problem of the system was later pointed out as the absence of a central body
which can co-ordinate or control independent sectoral policies of Specialized Agencies. For instance,
in the Capacity Study of 1969, also known as the Jackson Report, the Specialized Agencies were
called "principalities," and the organization of the system was considered to be the equivalent of
"some prehistoric monster."(United Nations, 1970:v)
Technical Assistance and the Creation of the UNDP
The core of the technical assistance concept at an early stage focused on the development of
human capital, and this was viewed as a natural task for the UN. To meet the urgent need of
investment in human resources, the Economic and Social Council subsequently established the
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) to be financed by voluntary contributions.
Whereas EPTA was only coolly received by industrialized countries, it was later supported by
President Truman's address in 1950 which emphasized the need to provide large-scale assistance to
developing countries, preferably through the UN. In considering the optimism of those first years
after the Second World War, EPTA represented the belief that the transfer of know ledge, skills and
technology, would help recipient countries achieve economic independence in a decade or so. Longterm experts and grants for fellowships were the two main instruments to achieve these
objectives.(Kaufmann, 1991:88)
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Later it proved that "technical assistance alone was inadequate in solving the problems of the
poor countries. The work of the experts in the field could be made much more effective if
supplemented with long-term low-interest loans to finance investments in schools, hospitals,
agricultural equipments and industrial plants." In response to this challenge, a Special UN Fund for
Economic Development (SUNFED) was recommended by a committee, appointed by the UN
Secretary-General. However, the recommendation was not adopted due to strong opposition from
the Ministers of Finance of developed countries led by the United States.(Weiss, et al., 1995:179)
They argued that the primary responsibility for international lending activities belonged to the World
Bank. As a compromise, the UN Special Fund was set up in 1958 with a broader mandate than
EPTA. The Special Fund focused on large projects which could yield immediate results. In addition
to offering technical assistance, it would support preinvestment studies and demonstration
projects.(Kaufrnann, 1990:19) The pressure for financing development also led to the creation of the
International Development Fund (IDA) which since has been affiliated to the World Bank. 3
The First UN Development Decade was inspired by President John F. Kennedy's address at the
General Assembly in September 1961. It was designed to promote development worldwide in
accordance with a set of targets laid down by the United Nations. This increased the need for coordination, and the General Assembly decided to merge the EPT A with the Special Fund for the
creation of the UNDP in 1965. The role of the UNDP was soon recognized as a central co-ordinating
agency by the 1969 Jackson report. In accordance with a "Consensus Resolution" of the General
Assembly Resolution in 1970 based on the Jackson report, the UNDP adopted the partnership
principle and the five year development cycle. 4 The scheme was supposed to enhance the coordination between the various parts of the UN system as they all had to work within the framework
6

of the country program.
This phase in UN efforts to strengthen international cooperation for economic development
was led by the American belief that a second Marshall plan could bring a rising curve of economic
development to the new independent states of the Third World. "This appears to have been a mixture
of arrogance and naivete. It was arrogant to take it for granted that the Western model of economic
development had universal validity. It was naive to believe in instant modernization. It was naive,
too, to idealize the politics ofliberation and ignore the diversity of cultural backgrounds in the Third
world." As indicated by the appointment of Paul Hoffman, former administrator of the Marshall
Plan, as the head ofUNDP, American enthusiasm for First UN Development Decade was part of the
great ideological contest between capitalism and communism (Jakobson, 1993:136).
In the last twenty years, the reality has substantially changed from that of 1970. The central
funding principle was seriously undermined by the emergence of "multi-bi" projects executed by
Specialized Agencies. Donor countries began to prefer projects which allow them to influence the
selection of the beneficiary. This new practice led to the disintegration of the country program
process. Independent financial resources enabled Agencies to implement a technical assistance
project which does not have any direct link with the country program. (Kaufmann, et al., 1991:94)
The sudden rise in funding for technical cooperation by the World Bank since the 1970s has also
seriously weakened the function of the UNDP. 5 Compared to $38 million in 1968, the Bank, by the
early 1990s, attained a level of about $1.5 billion, surpassing the contributions to UNDP, and this
marked the end of the central funding principle. (Kaufmann, et al., 1991:93)
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Response to the NIEO
By the end of the first Development Decade, Third World countries themselves began to lead
the discussion of economic development in the UN system. This inevitably resulted in a new
approach to the development issue. "It was not enough for the developed countries to provide
assistance; the structure of economic relations in the world also had to be changed before developing
countries could have a genuine chance to improve their economic performance." (Jakobson,
1993:137) The restructuring of the international economic system required planned policy actions
on a wide range of issues, including commodity prices, trade in manufactured products, international
shipping, the international monetary system, the transfer of technology, transnational corporations,
etc. For this objective, the UN became the principal forum for negotiations.
Representing the interests of Third World countries, the UNCTAD attempted to facilitate the
co-ordination of activities of other institutions within the United Nations system in the field of
international trade and related problems of economic development. In a similar manner, all activities
of the United Nations System in the field of industrial development were promoted by the UNIDO.
However, to press their demand, developing countries soon switched their battleground to the
General Assembly during the second half of the 1970s. The Sixth UN Special Session of 197 4
dramatized these efforts of developing countries by adopting the Declaration and Program of Action
for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 6 The Declaration recognized
the demands of the Group of 77 in the areas of trade, commodities, aid, industrialization, the transfer
of technology and similar matters. Developed countries accepted it but only with many reservations.
Some argue that the NIEO was never concerned with protecting economic and social interests
of people. It was rather a reflection of the demands of the governments of the new countries. 7 "By
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basing its nonnative propositions on the principle of the sovereign equality of all states, it has
afforded the cover of its ideology to all political regimes, even those which systematically violate
civil and political rights and pay no heed to social justice." Moreover, it offered only a limited
analysis of the economic relations between developed and developing countries. Thus, it is not
surprising that "it has not won support either from the representatives of the rich countries or from
all of the defenders of the Third World." (Bertrand, 1989:48)
Stalemate in Dialogue
The North-South dialogue has not been successful in many areas after the failure to launch
a new round of Global Negotiations in the 1980s and the 1990s, including UNCTAD VI in Belgrade,
1983, UNCTAD VII in Gevenva, 1987, and UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena, 1992. The frustration with
multilateral cooperation soon led to an attack on the UN's function as a North-South dialogue
platform. The situation was worsened by changes in the political environment of major Western
governments. They quickly put emphasis on free market solutions and opposed collective action
often called for by UN and Specialized Agency resolutions. Bilateralism and regionalism replaced
multilateral efforts to achieve economic development through the UN system.
Meanwhile, the global debt of developing countries doubled in the 1980s to more than $130
billion, while official development aid transfers did not increase. Moreover, capital flight and high
interest rate payments caused a reverse net capital movement from developing to developed
countries. Thus, the 1980s witnessed the stagnation in economic growth of the planet's poor regions.
Despite a few economic problems such as unemployment and inflation, on the other hand, the
average income of rich countries has at least quadrupled since Word War II. This international
situation was reflected in the politics of the UN system.
9

The General Assembly's Eighteenth Special Session, from 23 April to 2 May 1990, focused
on the world economic situation and international economic cooperation. It discussed conditions for
growth and development in developing countries, but the atmosphere was completely different. Ten
years ago dominant issues were how to achieve the goals of NIEO, and discussions focused on
launching a new round of global negotiations for supervising and controlling transnational
corporations. Instead of these issues, the 1990 Special Session heard of domestic economic policy
failures, the need of a free market approach, the significance of human rights, etc. The Eighteenth
Special Session revealed the increasing marginalization of developing countries and their peoples.
The Session was unable to reach agreement on a substantive debt relief paragraph in its Resolution.
Especially since the 1980s, operative control over international development policy has been
taken over by the IMF and the World Bank whereas the various UN Agencies superficially discussed
global economic and social issues without any action. As President George Bush pointed out, "in
a world where ideology no longer confronts and big power blocs no longer divide, the Bank and the
Fund have become paradigms of international cooperation." Reflecting this view, the US and some
other Western countries adopted policies which deny the UN any significant role in the discussion
of international economic policy matters. The best example is the US government's reluctance to
participate in the Special General Assembly Session on development questions in April 1990. This
Western position contributed to the failure to initiate a new round of global negotiations on
international economic policies in the UN. (Kaufmann, et al., 1990:17)
Structural Divisions and Political Realities
The UN system has expanded in an ad hoc manner as new institutions were established on
the basis of newly perceived needs. (Donini, 1988:292) For example, in response to the needs of

Third World countries, more than two dozen new Agencies and Special Funds were created in the
UN system between the middle of the 1960s and the early 1980s. These agencies include
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IF AD), United Nations Population Fund
(UNPFA), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), World Food Programme
(WFP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) as well as United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO). Compared with the IFAD, UNFPA, UNITAR, and WFP, a few agencies,
including UNCTAD and UNIDO, clearly represented the dissatisfaction of poor countries with
western dominated aganices like GATT and.ILG. Even though the goals of the NIEO were never
achieved, its supporting institutions remain. Now the UN system "resembles an army equipped and
deployed to fight an enemy that has vanished." (Jakobson, 1993: 149)
These agencies have different economic theories and organizational ideologies from those
of such agencies as the Bretton Woods Institutions and GATT. Contrary to a free market economic
approach, the UNCTAD and the General Assembly supported an interventionist approach. In the
views of the interventionists, "the division of the benefits of economic interchange between the rich
and the poor countries must be reviewed as a consequence of the relative bargaining strengths of the
two groups rather than be left to the working of normal market forces." Thus, interventionists argue
that poverty was caused by the drain on their resources which results from the powerful entrenched
institutional position and bargaining power of developed countries. Institutional mechanisms are
needed to redress the balance. (Williams, 1987:145)
Since the UNCTAD Secretariat primarily promotes the interests ofless developed countries,
developed countries have a tendency to bypass the UNTCAD. (Weiss, 1986) Unlike other organs
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in the UN system, the Fund and the Bank are like corporations in which each member holds a certain
number of shares. Their decision making process is not based on the majority vote but on the amount
of financial contributions. Another character of those agencies is that they maintain a technocratic
approach to economic problems. 8 The power and influence of the Bank, the Fund, and the GATT
come from sufficient financial support of rich Western industrialized countries. On the other hand,
the Fund is widely resented in developing countries as "a stem custodian of financial rectitude." This
dichotomy between agencies oriented to the needs of Third World countries and the Bretton Woods
institutions has been detrimental to the functioning of the UN economic system. 9
The Third World does not have the political and economic strength needed to restructure the
world economy, but they have the voting power to influence the UN. Marginalization of Third World
countries and the renewed emphasis on a free market approach weakened the role of the UN system
in major international economic decision making. The reality is that industrialized countries discuss
world economic problems through G7 and OECD. They are not interested in strengthening the UN
system where Third World countries can have a majority vote. For industrialized countries, the role
of UN agencies is minimal except the World Bank, the IMF, and GATT. Other UN agencies are not
viewed as having any influence on their prosperity by rich countries. This significantly undermines
the function of such UN organs as the Second Committee of the General Assembly, the Economic
and Social Council, the UNCTAD, and the UNIDO.
The resurgence of free market economic approaches since the early 1980s strengthened a role
of international financial institutions in economic policy making in poor countries. Given the fact
that the concern with human welfare is certainly less distinctive in the World Bank and the IMF than
other major UN agencies, development goals would be better served both when no single foreign
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source of ideas and finance has disappropriate power and when indigenous technical capacity is built
to the point that genuine policy dialogue, based on mutual respect, takes place between external
donors and local people. 10 A single model of development cannot be recommended as a universal
norm in which circumstances, possibilities, socioeconomic preferences, and political values of
developing countries are so varied. 11
Institutional Inadequacies for Economic Cooperation
Ever since the drafting of the Charter, defining common objectives for all member states at
the world level has been a difficult task. Consensus on the role of international co-ordination is more
difficult to attain now than at any time since 1945. Developed and developing countries could agree
on broad development goals and some important policy strategies before the 1970s. In the 1960s a
major role of a government in achieving growth through economic planning was widely recognized,
and state action was encouraged to stimulate and direct economic growth. International policies
generally supported the efforts of Third World governments to develop technology and industrial
skills. However, the consensus which had earlier emerged over major principles of economic
development was broken down. Since the early 1980s there has been more emphasis on
strengthening existing social, economic, and cultural structures of a free market economy.
Economic development policies have been influenced by conflicting interests in the world
which is comprised of a mass of organized and unorganized economic, social and political forces.
There are different perceptions, expectations, interests between industrialized and developing
countries. However, no reliable methods or structures for multilateral negotiation were adopted. The
most serious obstacle is inequality between the member states. Poor countries do not have any
influence on problems which are important to their economies. Their efforts have been mainly
13

concentrated on building majorities. (Renninger, 1989:249) But the success in gaining the majority
in the executive boards of various UN bodies did not produce any meaningful dialogue between the
North and the South. The paragraphs ofresolutions show fine words simply to "conceal the fact that
no agreement has been reached, either because there were no genuine negotiations or because the
positions of the various governments are so far apart that there is no chance of a true
rapproachment." (Bertrand, 1989:29)
The absence of procedures designed for binding agreements is related to the failure to define
negotiation structures that are suited to the problems and are accepted by all participants. Binding
solutions cannot be achieved in a weighted voting system as was adopted by the Bretton Woods
organizations. The system does not recognize the fact that member states take decisions jointly by
allowing the weak to make themselves heard. On the other hand, the majority votes of the Group of
77 did not prove of any real importance, since the majorities formed by poor countries are not taken
seriously by rich countries. It produces the adoption of resolutions that have no practical
consequences. Thus, the lack of realistic representation resulted in preference to bilateral
negotiations in which concrete questions can be dealt with. (Bertrand, 1989:50)
Proposals for Reform of the UN Economic System
Most UN reform proposals have paid attention to the coordination among agencies and the
cooperation between rich and poor countries. Unmanageable intergovernmental decision making and
negotiation apparatus are responsible for the lack of systematic resource allocation procedures and
effective accountability mechanisms. 12 However, building consensus on new mechanisms for
economic assistance has not been easy. New financial and institutional arrangements can influence
power relations between UN agencies which have different economic priorities. The discussion
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about a more coordinated policy making structure cannot be separated from how to reconcile
different economic strategies such as the promotion of a free market and the satisfaction of basic
human needs.
One of the most important tasks for the UN is to ensure an economic dialogue between rich
and poor countries. In most UN reform proposals (United Nations, 1970, 1975, 1985), there has been
emphasis on strengthening the ECOSOC. 13 Recently, the Secretary General suggested that ECO SOC,
a body of fifty four member states, should be transformed into a Council of Ministers supported by
a policy-planning staff for development at UN headquarters. In this proposal, the Council of
Ministers for Economic and Social Affairs would be given the authority to review the medium-term
plans and documents of the organizations of the UN system. Thus it would contribute to rational
utilization of resources in the light of global priorities as defined by the Council and bring about
greater strength and coherence to the system as a whole. (Bertrand, 1989:125-6)
The report of the Nordic UN Project presented to the General Assembly in 1991 also
proposes the establishment of a high-level international development council to discuss development
issues and bring general guidance for the UN system. 14 The function of the council may be
undertaken by a reformed ECOSOC. The report also suggests "strengthening and enlarging
ECOSOC so it becomes a universal body in session in parallel with the General Assembly while the
Second and Third Committees of General Assembly should be abolished." (Seufer-Barr, 1993:40)
The UN working group established in October 1992 suggests the transformation of the
governing bodies of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) into smaller executive boards under the overall authority of the
Economic and Social Council. (Seufer-Barr, 1993: 39) Similar arrangements would apply to the
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Committee of Food Aid Policies and Programmes, which sets policy for the World Food Programme
(WFP). Some believe that improved leadership is required to cope with urgent tasks of the UN and
suggest creating three deputies to the Secretary General one of whom would assist in the areas of
economic and social matters with stress on sustainable development. (Urquhart and Childers, 1990) 15
Several proposals, including reports of a study group of the World Institute for Development
Economics Research (WIDER), suggest the creation of a World Economic Council, equivalent to
the Security Council, in order to carry out a reform of existing global multilateral institutions and,
more generally, supervise and coordinate "global macroeconomic policy." (WIDER, 1989)
According to the UNDP and the North-South Roundtable proposals, a new Development Security
Council needs to design a global policy framework in all key economic and social areas. (UNDP,
1992; ul Haq, 1995) 16 More specifically, it should reach political agreements on specific policy
responses to such issues as global poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, and ecological pollution.
These proposals recommend that smaller industrial countries and developing countries join forces
and delegate authority to a representative group which would participate in the world summit.
Especially, the WIDER report presents an elaborate scheme for a voting system based upon three
objective criteria reflecting their economic and political weight in the world--GNP, trade, and
population. Some of former UN civil servants have also proposed an Economic Security Council
which would be able to formulate macro-economic policy that can be supported by the North and
the South. (Childers and Urquhart, 1994) They believe that the new Economic Security Council is
needed because the current ECOSOC does not function at a high enough level of representation.
(Childers and Urquhart, 1994:61)
On the other hand, others propose regional approaches to development by strengthening the
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regional economic commissions. The UN can still remain as a forum for generating concerns and
ideas of development. But the structure is not adequate for producing agreements. Specific
negotiations should be based on a collective bargaining process at a regional level. Operational
structures of the UN system should be reconverted into regional development agencies or
enterprises. (Renninger, 1987:90)
In a special report for the 1985 UN Anniversary, the Joint Inspection Unit of the UN
proposed transformation of the UN system into a European community style decision making body
based on the structure of commissions and councils. (United Nations, 1985:52) In its view, an
expansion of this type of structure on a global scale could require the establishment of two or even
three commissions. Commissions will include people who were chosen by national governments but
act in accordance with the interests of the community. Though this proposal indicates that consensus
can be more easily reached in the structure of councils and commissions, this approach may not
solve the North-South problems. Unlike the European Community, economic disparities between
poor and rich countries in the world would make it difficult to reconcile different views on economic
development strategies and redistribution of global wealth.
Some believe that the best hope for coordination can be found at the country level. They
suggest the use of Country Strategy Note (CSN) voluntarily created by recipient countries. 17 It
should identify programs which are compatible with the country's development needs. It can
facilitate a coherent approach by identifying plans and priorities which are unique for a specific
country. (the Stanley Foundation, 1995:27) The CSN can strengthen the status and capacities of the
UN resident coordinators who coordinate policies at the sectoral as well as the project level. On the
other hand, the CSN may not represent the needs of people by too heavily relying on the government
17

for identifying development goals.
The Need for New Institutional Arrangements
The recognition of human need oriented development at various international fora generates
demand for more radical reform than the creation of a more efficient system. While the Economic
Security Council can be organized to seek to design a global policy framework in all key economic
and social areas, it will be very difficult to create such a body given the objections to a more
centralized UN system. It is politically unrealistic to expect Western industrialized countries to pay
more attention to the elimination of poverty in Third World countries than the maintenance of the
international economic order based on principles of free market economiies. Most importantly, the
creation of a new central organ would address only the interests of government elites and
international economic bureaucrats.
There is fairly general professional, governmental and popular consensus within Third World
countries that the relative influence of the IMF and the World Bank, particularly the latter, has grown
too large. How to address the imbalance in decision making power between different regions of the
world has not been seriously considered in most official UN proposals. Despite the need for a policy
framework to promote basic human needs, there is little agreement as to what should or can be done
about it. For example, should Third World governments seek to reform the ECOSOC or to
strengthen a regional policy making framework such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa
or Latin America? How should they press for more diversified sources of external assistance while
somehow still seeking to minimize dependency and improve aid coordination? In what ways should
they improve various forms of South-South exchange and cooperation within the UN system?
In considering problems with and opposition to the current role of the Bretton Woods
18

Institutions in the Third World, human development is likely to be best served when no single
foreign source of ideas and finance has disproportinate power; and indigenous technical capacity is
built to the point where genuine policy dialogue, based on mutual respect, takes place between
external donors and local policy makers, and where development programs are fully and
unambiguously locally constructed. The reduced role of the IMF and the World Bank, larger
influence of UN technical agencies, and economic integration and cooperation within the South will
remain the major agenda for the reform of global economic governance.
In pursuing global policies to deal with economic insecurity such as deteriorating living
standards and a lack of social welfare, in the views of the Vice Executive Director of UNICEF
Richard Jolly, various UN technical agencies are more appropriate to the development of programs
since they are multidiciplinary and already concerned with a variety of the broader, but often
neglected, areas of development such as women's concerns, children's needs, urban problems,
environment, etc. The common element among UN technical and regional agencies is their human
focus and concern which are certainly "less distinctive" in the World Bank and the IMF. It would
be helpful "to bring the U.N. agencies together in support of some form of special and coherent
commitment to the human dimension of economic development, not merely as short term, stopgap
arrangement, but as a means for strengthening long-term survival and development on a new basis."
(Jolly, 1985:395)
On the issues of satisfying the basic social and economic needs of the poor, there has been
discussion on the role of WHO, UNICEF, ILO, and other UN agencies and the ways for more
effective international collaboration with other international groups. One of rriain issues in this area
has been the lack of a clear definition of links between development agencies of the UN and the
19
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Bretton Woods Institutions, and their respective roles. In considering financial power of the Bank
and the Fund, perhaps, a merger of development programs would not be desirable nor necessary.
(Jolly, 1985:395) The discussion of cooperation should focus on institutionalizing the human
development issues in macro-economic planning.
More active involvement of UN agencies in the development of Third World countries
should be related to strengthening a democratic process in economic policy making and local
capacity to manage economic programs. More specifically, efforts need to be made to recognize
sustainable development initiatives and to involve diverse cultural and ethnic groups in the
formulation and implementation of community projects. The participatory decision making process
can facilitate open and efficient communication between development agencies and local groups
engaged in promotion of basic human needs projects. In this context, it is essential to redefine the
relationship between international financial institutions, UN technical agencies, and grassroots
development groups. Non-government organizations should be strengthened given the fact that they
are more actively involved in the human aspects of development than governmental or
intergovernmental agencies.
New Roles for the UN Agencies and Regional Institutions
The current systems for development coordination are compartmentalized. To avoid
duplication and overlapping, various agencies need to have greater collaboration. The relationships
between UN Special Agencies vary, and cooperation is often based on individual and ad hoc
relationships. Effectiveness has been a major concern in the discussion of reform. Yet the efficient
management of the UN economic system should be considered in the context of the creation of a
more participatory process. Especially, the consultative process can emerge more easily on a regional
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basis. Specific development issues such as food and health should be coordinated by relevant UN
technical agencies. Initiatives for development planning can be led by UN regional Economic
Commissions, given the fact that each region has its own set of economic problems. The voice of
NGOs would be represented better in a regional planning process. To give more impact on policy
making, NGOs may organize a consortium or a network on a regional basis. They can interact with
each other as well as with regional Economic Commissions.
In the areas of establishing an appropriate framework of development aid coordination, we
may suggest different roles for the UNDP. One approach is that since UNDP has more technical
expertise on economic planning and project development, UNDP offices can play a key role in
identifying development problems in certain countries, allocating resources, linking projects of
various UN agencies to the overall planning. This approach may guarantee efficiency in resource
allocation but may create an undesirable bureaucratic process with concentration of more planning
and decision making power at one or few offices. In addition, it is not politically feasible given the
fact that other UN agencies will not sacrifice their perceived missions and roles for better aid
coordination.
The UNDP can engage in the policy dialogue on employment, poverty, human resources
development which can be neglected because of the focus on crisis management and financial
imbalances. The UNDP can cultivate its special relationships with the planning ministries in
developing countries and work as a major funding agencies for technical assistance. The UNDP may
also assist in reducing the institutional divide between the Finance Ministry, which negotiates with
the financial institutions, and the Planning and sectoral ministries, in order to reintroduce in the
dialogue concerns about the real economy and society; to mobilize the energies and thinking of the
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UN specialized agencies in order to bring co-ordinated analysis and advice to the developing
countries.
An alternative role for the UNDP puts stress on communication rather than planning
activities. The UNDP currently has a resident representative system in many countries and has
organized many Roundtable Meetings designed to coordinate development assistant programs of
various donors. It also tries to help economic planning ministries of Third World countries build
indigenous economic planning capacities through its technical aid program. Thus UNDP is in a good
position to develop communication networks to link various UN and government agencies. They
also need to extend their relationships to grassroots development groups. By actively organizing
Roundtable Meetings in developing countries and utilizing the system of resident representatives of
its own or other UN agencies, UNDP can gather information about aid programs of various UN
agencies and provide analysis of economic necessities of specific countries. In addition, it may
identify similar projects initiated by different agencies to help avoid any waste of resources, and
improve communication among agencies which may intend to develop common projects. In this
approach, while UNDP needs to be more active in promoting communication, aid planning should
be made at each agency but in consultation with other agencies. Most importantly, however, if
necessary, other UN agencies should also play a leading role in their areas of concern, as UNICEF
did in the area of programs to reduce social impact of government austerity programs on the poor.
With respect to regional coordination, few reform proposals in the past emphasized
strengthening the regional economic commissions. The UN can still remain as a forum for generating
concerns and ideas of development. But the structure is not adequate for producing agreements. It
is very difficult to reach consensus at a global setting, no matter whether discussion is made at the
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Council, Committee, or Parliamentary structure. Thus, specific negotiations should be based on a
collective bargaining process at a regional level. Operational structures of the UN system should be
reconverted into regional development agencies or enterprises. (Renninger, 1987:90)
The UN Economic Commissions for Africa, Latin America, and Asia should participate more
in economic planning. The regional Economic Commissions have special knowledge and focus on
the specific regions of the world and can share planning functions with UNDP. The role of regional
banks such as African Bank in financial mobilization needs to be strengthened especially in
considering that Bank/Fund loans have strict conditions which may actually have a negative impact
on poor regions of the world. In addition, self-reliance can be achieved only by the increased lending
activities of the regional banks rather than external funding.
In the context of economic policy reform in Third World countries, another important
dimension is regional cooperation and efforts to build an economic community. For example, the
OAU (Organization of African Unity) summit, which took place in Abuja, Nigeria, from June 3-5,
1991, proposed the idea of an African Economic Community. Reflecting experiences of existing
West African and South African Economic Communities, African countries gradually recognize the
need for regional self-reliance which requires utilization of indigenous technology and exchange of
resources within the region. The OAU proposal envisions, within the first quarter of the twenty first
century, the eventual creation of a free trade area in the region, which will be developed from
existing regional economic communities (West Africa, June 1-3 0, 1991: 10152-4). The influence of
regional agencies will grow if current efforts to build mechanisms for regional economic cooperation
such as African Economic Community are realized.
Another issue for the future reform, perhaps, the most important, is participation of local
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NGOs. One of the most ignored concerns is the involvement ofNGOs in economic policy making
within the UN system. NGOs should be part of a consultation and decision making network. NGO
liaison offices of UN agencies should gather information about indigenous, home grown NGO
projects. It is desirable for UN agencies to avoid initiating any programs or projects in the areas
where NGOs are actively involved. It is also desirable that NGO projects be supported or
complemented by UN agency programs. Consultative policy making mechanisms need to be built
to strengthen the ties of the UN to local NGOs.
The most complicated issue is how to define relations with the World Bank and the IMF.
About twenty seven years ago, one of the most influential UN study on reform for international aid
coordination suggested that UNDP should be more engaged in preliminary research and initiation
of development aid programs, while the World Bank take a lead in formulation of programs. (UN,
1969) The introduction of structural adjustment, which emphasize devaluation of currency, removal
of price controls, and elimination of government subsidies to basic necessities, placed many UN
agencies in odd relationships with the Bank since the early 1980s. Given their interest in human
development, some of the most important UN agencies, including UNICEF, ILO, WHO, and
UNCTAD, criticized either directly or indirectly various aspects of Bank/Fund sponsored adjustment
programs and showed concerns about the increase in Fund and Bank influence. The most vivid and
direct criticisms have been so far made by Economic Commission for Africa, and the World Bank
even had to issue an internal memorandum to defend their policies. Though UNDP cooperated with
the Bank on the production of a document in support of structuctural adjustment in 1989, its annual
reports on Human Development clearly point out problems with human dimensions of BanldFund
adjustment programs. Overall, as many UN agency officials argue, any cooperation with the Bank
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should not be made by its terms, and their financial support on UN development projects should be
carefully reviewed. 18
The reform may start with promoting cooperation between UN agencies involved in basic
human needs projects and building coalitions with government agencies and local groups interested
in human need issues. One interesting example is the role of UNICEF in the formulation of programs
to mitigate the social impact of structural adjustment in Ghana. Structural adjustment programs
based on macroeconomic balance often sacrificed the needs of the poor and the vulnerable in society.
Since the beginning of structural adjustment in Ghana in 1983, UNICEF conducted research on
human welfare conditions in Ghana in cooperation with University of Ghana. This research was soon
supported by the ministries of health and education, but was ignored by the World Bank and the
ministry of finance. But later the impact of adjustment policies on the economically marginalized
groups became clear, and the significance of UNICEF research was recognized even by Bank
officials. Subsequently, a program to deal with the negative impact of structural adjustment in Ghana
was launched in 1987. Given the small budget of the program and its complementary nature to
orthodox adjustment programs, the program may be considered insignificant, but UNICEF study has
some impact on policy orientations of the Bank and Fund. 19 Even though they did not produce any
tangible outcome, UNICEF efforts also helped hold meetings among some UN agencies, including
WHO and ILO, to discuss the impact of liberal economic reform on the urban and poor populations.
Conclusion
Reform in UN social and economic activities has become an important issue over the last
several decades. More than a decade ago, a UNITAR study by Martin Hill (1978) warned of the
danger of the UN being by-passed and rendered ineffective. Currently, the Bretton Woods
25

Organizations are perceived as being the places where the real action takes place, and the United
Nations, in the economic sphere, is left with the management of residual functions. In addition, no
one can ignore "the significance of the rapidly growing importance of the OECD, the tendency of
the EEC to take independent action. This trend seems to have been intensified with the Western
economic summits and the preference of some donors for bilateral rather than multilateral
development assistance." (Renninger, 1987:99-100)
The reform of the UN requires efforts to build consensus on the management of global
economic issues. States cannot take joint activities in the fields in which they are not able to agree.
Economic cooperation would not be brought about by action programs devoid of any substance. On
the other hand, independent national strategies in the economic and social fields cannot be effective
without taking into account the strategies, methods, and principles accepted by other countries. The
principle of reciprocal support at the UN can create the need for a solid world political framework
that has to be built.
The role of the UN is to organize an international debate that would allow the North and the
South to explore, jointly, their differences in perception and to find a common ground at a time when
there is no international consensus on development and the working assumptions about the nature
of the world economy. International economic decision-making toward the next century will require,
without doubt, much broader vision. (Jolly, 1995:191) UN agencies need to be brought together in
support of some form of special commitment to the human dimension of development not merely
as short term arrangement but as a means to strengthen long-term survival of the poor. The inclusion
ofNGOs in the policy making and implementation would be especially beneficial in the periods of
economic deterioration in many parts of the world. 20
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Notes

1. The author wishes to thank members of the IPRA (International Peace Research Association)
Global Political Economy Study Commission for their support in preparing this paper. The
valuable comments from Miles Wolpin (State University ofNew York, Potsdam, US), Imtiaz
Ahmed (University of Dhaka, Bangladesh), Imre Levai (Hungarian Academy, Hungary), and
Rainer A. Ibana (Manila University, Philppines) on an early draft of this paper especially need to
be recognized. The preparation of the final draft was helped by the comments of Chadwick F.
Alger (the Ohio State University, US) and Martin Rochester (University of Missouri-St. Louis,
US). However, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent all the comments
of the reviewers.
2. The emphasis on economic cooperation in the UN Charter reflects, in part, learning from
mistakes of the League of Nations. The League Covenant contained only a single reference to
economic affairs. The intellectual hegemony of liberal economics since World War I led to the
rejection of any regulatory role of economic institutions. It was also believed that welfare would
be optimized by the free operation of international markets.
3. In addition, the United Nations Capital Development Fund was created under the auspices of
the UN General Assembly in 1966 and has become fully operational since 1974. It has been
administered by the UNDP. The Fund supplements other sources of capital assistance for the
least developed countries by offering grants and loans on concessionary terms.
4. UNDP has a consensus rule at its governing council. 45 industrialized countries, and 50
developing countries are represented in the body. The decision of aid is based on the need of
recipients. They calculate the population, per capita GNP, and decide the amount of funding
needed for a country. They also use a 5 year plan to estimate the medium and long term needs of
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the recipients.
5. This view is shared by a report presented to the Second Committee of the General Assembly.
Due to "a consequence of the shortcomings of the United Nations system, the World Bank group
and the regional development banks have become more prominent, in the field of technical
assistance, than was the case when the present system conceived. There are, thus, clear
tendencies of a marginalization of the United Nations." (United Nations, 1991:2)

6. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UN later in the year
helped Third World countries extend the scope of the NIEO. This document includes, in detail,
the principle and practices needed to implement the NIEO.
7. In his comments on this paper, Miles Wolpin, Professor, State University of New York,
Potsdam, suggests that the UN system itself is comprised of nation-states which are represented
by government elites. The economic interests of people are not well represented by a system
which does not lend significance to the welfare of grassroots people. The NIEO can be criticized
for a lack of dramatic structural change which is necessary to deal with poverty and inequitable
distribution of wealth in the world. The comments were received in August 1994.
Similar views about the structure of the UN are suggested by other scholars. "As the United
Nations attempts to deal with global problems, there are contradictions between its basic
structure and the tasks it is called upon to perform. It is fundamentally a union of states founded
to preserve the system of states. Its relationships with the peoples of the world are normally
carried out through state officials, who naturally wish to preserve the prerogatives of states,
including their own positions in the state system." (Alger, 1995:27)
8. In the international financial institutions, ministers of commerce and finance are represented,
and the use of technical language by them contributed to their reputation as serious institutions.
This can be compared with the discussion of broad economic issues at the General Assembly by
representatives of governments who do not have deep economic knowledge.
9. Though the Bretton Woods institutions are associated with the ECO SOC under the terms of
Article 57 of the UN Charter, the relationship is mostly symbolic. The institutions are not subject
to substantive coordination at the ECOSOC or the ACC meetings. Their link is limited to
occasional appearance of their chief executive officers before ECO SOC and their participation in
some other meetings. (Adedeji, 1995:70)
10. Development, defined as the full development of individual human potential, can only be
achieved by "a highly decentralized global policy process." (Alger, 1990: 167)
11. In the views of Imre Levai, Senior Researcher, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary,
the "political difficulties inherent on the (long) existing and 'amortised' system" should be more
explicitly recognized. "We may speak of development in general but the newly emerged world
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develops in a particular way and even the questions relating to the paradigms are not asked." The
present UN Economic System needs to take into consideration pragmatic aspects in this context.
These comments were offered by Dr. Levai on October 1994.

12. In his comments on the early draft of this paper, Imtiaz Ahmed, Professor, University of
Dhaka, Bangladesh, points out that it would be unwise to "take a positivist approach (i.e.
isolating 'economic system' from other systems) in the understanding of the problem at hand. A
more holistic and dialectical approach would be better." In this connection, we need to ask to
what extent the UN economic system has served and failed. His comments were received on
November 1994.
13. ECOSOC's failure can be attributed to complexity of issues, inadequate size, resistance of the
specialized agencies to give up their autonomy, the shift of major discussion to UNCTAD, the
General Assembly's Second or Third Committee, and the Group of Seven, etc. (Rochester,
1993:138-139)
14. The report was jointly prepared by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden.
15. The most recent efforts to strengthen the leadership capacity to streamline and rationalize
development activities led to the creation of the Department for Policy Coordination and
Sustainable Development, the Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy
Analysis, and the Department of Development Support and Management Services within the UN
Secretariat. This resulted from the consultation of the Secretary-General with a panel of
independent high-level advisors in 1992.

16. Similar proposals were also made by the US World Federalist Movement. They call for the
creation of "an Economic Security Council reorganized out of the current UN Economic and
Social Council" which would coordinate monetary stabilization and trade programs as well as
development programs. This body would also assist nations with non-military economic
conversion and support the role of women in development (Allen, 1991:87).
17. The CSN was adopted in General Assembly Resolution 47-199 in 1992 which is intended to
create a demand oriented method of coordination. It describes a recipient country's expectation of
the role of the UN agencies in development. It is to be used to evaluate how the UN projects help
to satisfy the country's development needs.
18. Interviews with WHO officials in Geneva in July 20, 1990, and UNICEF and UNDP officials
in New York, December 19, 1990.

19. Interviews with a high IMF official, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1991.
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20. There is growing belief that "it is no longer enough to coordinate international organizations.
NGOs play a role in filling gaps left by the relative loss of power of the state." (Stanley
Foundation, 1995:29)

30

References

Adams, James and Jennifer Rietbergen-McCracken. "Participatory Development: Getting the Key
Players Involved." Finance & Development. Vol. 31. No. 3. September 1994. pp. 36-37.

Adedeji, Adebayo. "An African Perspective on Bretton Woods." in ul Haq, Mahbub, et al., eds. The
UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995. pp. 60-82.

Alger, Chadwick. "The United Nations in Historical Perspective." Chadwick Alger, Gene Lyons and
John Trent, eds. The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States. Tokyo: United Nations
University Press. 1995.

Alger, Chadwick, "Citizens and the UN System in a Changing World," Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed.,
Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
1994. pp. 301-329.

Alger, Chadwick, "Grass-roots Perspectives on Global Policies for Development." Journal of Peace
Research. Vol. 27. No.2. May 1990. pp. 155-168.

31

Allen, Anthony, "Development: Are New Institutions Needed?" ed., Hoffmann, Walter. A New
World Order: Can It Bring Security to the World's People? Washington, D.C.: World Federalist
Association. 1991. pp. 83-90.

Bertrand, Maurice. The Third Generation World Organization. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers. 1989.

Coate, Roger and Donald Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current
Assessment," Journal of Peace Research, 27 (May 1990), pp.127-140.

Donini, Antinio. "Resilience and Reform: Some Thoughts on the Processes of Change in the United
Nations." International Relations. 1988. pp.289-315.

George, Susan. "The Bretton Woods Institutions at 50 Years: a Critical Appraisal." in Janet Brian,
ed. The Proceedings of the South and the Bretton Woods Institutions Seminar. Geneva: the United
Nations Office. June 20-21, 1994.

Hill, Martin. The United Nations System: Co-ordinating Its Economic and Social Work. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978.

Jakobson, Max. The United Nations in the 1990s:A Second Chance? The Twentieth Century Fund.
1993.
32

Jeong, Ho-Won. "Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: A Critical Review of World Bank
and IMF Policies." The Journal oflnternational Studies. Number 36, June 1995. pp. 77-94.

Jolly, Richard. "Poverty Eradication and Human Development: Issues for the Twenty-First Century."
ul Haq, Mahbub, et al., eds. The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions. New York: St. Martin's
Press. 1995.pp. 185-195.

Kaufmann, Johan, Dick Leurdijk, and Nico Schrijver. The World in Turmoil: Testing the UN's
Capacity. The Academic Council on the United Nations System. 1991.

Kaufmann, Johan and Nico Schrijver. Changing Global Needs: Expanding Roles for the United
Nations System. The Academic Council on the United Nations System. 1990.

Lyons, G. "Reforming the United Nations", International Social Science Journal. May 1989.

Mayall, James. "The Institutional Basis of Post-War Economic Cooperation." in eds., Taylor, Paul
and A.J.R. Groom. International Institutions at Work. London: Pinter Publisher. 1988. pp. 53-74.

Muller, Joachim W. The Reform of the United Nations. Vol. I. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.
1992.

Renninger, John P. "The Failure to Lauch Global Negotiations at the 11th Special Session of the
33

General Assembly." ed., Kaufmann, Johan. Effective Negotiation: Case Studies in Conference
Diplomacy. 1989. pp. 231-54.

Renninger, John P. "Improving the United Nations System." Journal of Development Planning.
No.17. 1987. 86-111.

Rochester, Martin. Waiting for the Millennium: the United Nations and the Future of World Order.
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1993.

Seufer-Barr, Nancy. "Towards a New Clarity for UN Work." UN Chronicle. Vol. 30. No. 4.
December 1993. pp. 38-41.

The Stanley Foundation. United Nations-Bretton Woods Collaboration: How Much is Enough?.
1995.

Taylor, Paul. International Organization in the Modem World. London: Pinter Publishers. 1993.

ul Haq, Mahbub, et al., eds. The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions. New York: St. Martin's
Press. 1995.

United Nations. A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System. New York.
E.70.1.10. 1970.
34

United Nations. Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System. A New United
Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation. New York. E/AC.62/9. 1975.

United Nations. Joint Inspection Unit. Some Reflections on Reform of the United Nations. Geneva.
JIU/REP/85. 1985.

United Nations. Operational Activities for Development. New York. A/C.2/46/7. 1991.

UNCTAD, "Report of the UNCTAD Meeting on the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in
the Development of the Least Developed Countries, 1989." Transnational Associations. No. 1. pp.
31-35. 1990.

UNDP. Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 992.

Urquhart, B. and E. Childers. Renewing the United Nations System. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation. 1994.

Urquhart, B. and E. Childers. A World in Need of Leadership, Tomorrow's UN. Uppsala: Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation. 1990.

Weiss, Thomas G. "International Secretariat or Servant of the G77?: A Portrait ofUNCTAD." eds.
Pitt, David and Thomas G. Weiss. The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracy. Boulder: Westview
35

Press. 84-102.

Weiss, Thomas G. et al. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press.
1995.

Williams, Douglas. The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations. London: C.Hurst &
Company. 1987.

World Bank. The 1993 Progress Report on Cooperation between the World Bank and NGOs. A
Document of Operations Policy Department, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. February 2, 1994.

World Institute for Development Economics of the United Nations University. World Economic
Summits: the Role of Representative Groups in the Governance of the World Economy, Study
Group Series no.4, Helsinki, 1989.

36

